Lawyers and Lot Lines by Bernhardt, Roger
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Publications Faculty Scholarship
5-2004
Lawyers and Lot Lines
Roger Bernhardt
Golden Gate University School of Law, rbernhardt@ggu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Publications by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bernhardt, Roger, "Lawyers and Lot Lines" (2004). Publications. Paper 323.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/323
May 2004 
Lawyers and Lot Lines 
Roger Bernhardt 
Defending Encroachments 
What do you do when your client telephones to tell you that her neighbor has just informed 
her that he had a survey made and it showed that a long-standing improvement that she had 
always believed was located entirely on her property in fact encroaches on his land? Can she do 
anything to keep it there, despite the encroachment? There are several doctrines designed to give 
some relief to owners in this predicament, but three cases reported in this issue clearly weaken 
and narrow that help. Rather than proceed case by case, I will go at matters doctrine by doctrine.  
Duration of Encroachments 
Three Years: Permanent Encroachments Under CCP §338 
One way to protect an encroachment is by showing that it is permanent and has existed for 
more than three years. That should bring it under the limitations period of CCP §338(b), which 
covers “[a]n action for trespass upon or injury to real property.”  
Miller & Starr state this as a straightforward rule (6 Miller & Starr, California Real Estate 
§14.14 (3d ed 2000)), and it is commonly cited as such by our appellate courts (see Field-
Escandon v DeMann (1988) 204 CA3d 228, 251 CR 49); but that is not how two cases reported 
in this issue view it. First, Harrison v Welch (2004) 116 CA4th 1084, 11 CR3d 92, reported on p  
, declares that this view reflects a “flawed” reading of an old supreme court decision. According 
to Harrison, seeking to remove a permanent encroachment from land is really an attempt to 
recover the land itself, and therefore comes under the five-year statutes for those kind of actions, 
not the three years of CCP §338. Second, according to Kapner v Meadowlark Ranch Ass’n 
(2004) 116 CA4th 1182, 11 CR3d 138, reported on p   no time period applies when the 
encroachment is on a way shared by others, rather than just a neighbor’s land, because the lack 
of any exclusive possession in such a case means there is no trespass that would trigger the 
statute.  
Harrison and Kapner raise the question: If the three-year period did not apply in those cases, 
what kind of lawsuits are subject to it? An owner seeking to remove an encroachment is 
inevitably also seeking to recover possession of the land the encroachment occupies. Can the 
three-year statute be saved by limiting its application to actions for monetary rather than 
injunctive relief? While this may sound silly, the silliness is really intrinsic to the statutes 
themselves, which create overlapping three- and five-year periods for the same wrong. No 
distinction is going to make much sense, and now we have cases pro and con on whether three 
years is enough or too little—hardly a firm ground for basing legal advice about commencing 
litigation. 
Five Years: Ejectment or Adverse Possession Under CCP §§318, 323, 325 
Under CCP §318, an action for the recovery of possession of real property can only be brought 
by someone who possessed the property within five years of filing suit; so, if the offending 
structure has existed for at least five years, can your client claim that the duration alone is 
enough to protect it? Harrison v Welch also rejects that argument, ruling that this five-year 
statute on ejectment cannot be separated from its companion five-year statutes for adverse 
possession (CCP §§323 and 325). Your client must show not only five years of possession, but 
five years of possession during which the judicial and statutory standards for adverse possession 
were also met. For example, the encroachment had to be open and notorious (a judicial 
requirement; see, e.g., Kunza v Gaskell (1979) 91 CA3d 201, 210, 154 CR 101), as well as 
protected by a substantial enclosure or cultivated and improved (a statutory requirement; see 
CCP §325). The mere passage of five years, alone, gets your client nowhere. 
We can’t blame the courts for being silly here. There is simply no way to reconcile one statute 
that says five years of dispossessing is enough (CCP §318) with two others that say five years of 
possessing is enough only if additional requirements are also met (CCP §§323 and 325). Unlike 
the three-year/five-year difference, the outcome in this case is clear—five years, alone, never 
wins; despite the language of CCP §318, there are simply no circumstances where that section 
will apply.  
Adverse Possession: Tax Payments Requirement 
Theoretically, if an encroachment survives long enough, it can become invulnerable to attack 
under CCP §325, as a protected adverse possession. Your client has to show that her 
encroachment was open and notorious, continuous, uninterrupted, hostile, and under a claim of 
title; most of which can be generally satisfied by the mere existence of the encroachment itself. 
(Everybody can see it, it’s always there, and she has always believed that it belongs to her.) But 
CCP §325 goes on to require her to “have paid all the taxes, State, county, or municipal, which 
have been levied and assessed upon such land”—and this requirement is a killer. 
In 1948, Justice Traynor held that an occupant of the wrong lot could establish adverse 
possession despite having paid taxes on the lot next door, since both he and the assessor had 
mistakenly assumed that the house he lived in was on the lot that he owned; the legal description 
on the tax assessment rolls was not controlling for CCP §325 purposes. Sorensen v Costa (1948) 
32 C2d 453, 196 P2d 900. That holding should have meant that an owner of improved property, 
whose improvements stretch beyond her lot line onto the vacant parcel next door, should also be 
able to satisfy the tax payment requirement of CCP §325 if the lot next door continued to be 
assessed as vacant land and her own lot assessed as improved. Since Sorensen, however, the 
supreme court has rejected that common sense assumption and required some “direct evidence” 
that the encroaching improvements were considered in the assessment. See Gilardi v Hallam 
(1981) 30 C3d 317, 327, 178 CR 624. From the language in Gilardi, it appears to me that the 
Sorensen presumption applies only in parcel mix-up cases, i.e., when each owner’s house is 
entirely on her neighbor’s lot, and not when there are partial incursions that arise because of 
misunderstood lot lines. 
The tax requirement in encroachment cases is unlikely to be satisfied. Michael Slattery at the 
San Francisco City Attorney’s Office told me that our assessor’s office would not know how to 
generate a bill to the encroacher in such a case and would, instead, send a supplemental bill to 
the next door neighbor, as record owner, if an assessor actually saw the improvement. (He did 
call to my attention Rev & T C §610, which provides that a second person may add her name to 
the tax roll as an assessee, for adverse possession purposes; but he, like me, suspects that the 
provision applies only when the adverse possessor is occupying an entire parcel belonging to 
someone else, not just infringing on a part of it. He also pointed out Rev & T C §2188.2, 
allowing separate assessments for landowners and improvers, but opined that it would not enable 
the owner of an infringing building to pay taxes on just that part of her neighbor’s land.) 
The combined effect of our tax rules and case holdings is to rule out adverse possession 
protection in all encroachment cases. Only a possessor who sits on an entirely wrong lot and 
pays the taxes properly assessed to it can be protected by the statute (and perhaps also persons 
claiming adverse possession under color of title under CCP §323 (“claiming a title founded upon 
a written instrument, or a judgment or decree”), rather than CCP §325 (“not founded upon a 
written instrument, judgment, or decree”); §323 has no similar tax payment requirement).  
This difficulty cannot be blamed on the statute; it is strictly the result of some judicial rule 
making. The legislature may have been at fault initially for adding a completely unrelated tax 
payment requirement to adverse possession law at the behest of the railroads 150 years ago, but 
it was the judiciary that construed that requirement so as to inhibit the statute from 
accomplishing its most beneficial purpose—legitimizing long-standing improvements that 
unwittingly encroached. 
Prescriptive Easements 
Unlike adverse possession, the requirements for prescriptive easements do not include 
payment of taxes (primarily because we have no statutory codification of this old common law 
concept). However, the encroaching defendant in Harrison v Welch, supra, was not allowed to 
claim a prescriptive easement for her woodshed and landscaping because, according to the court, 
those easements would have been exclusive, and therefore possessory rather than usufructuary 
(i.e., pertaining to the right to use another’s property) interests. That meant the easements had to 
qualify under the adverse possession statutes—where they were doomed to fail because of the 
tax payment requirement. 
Excluding exclusive interests from the category of prescriptive easements is a fairly new 
doctrine, originating with Raab v Casper (1975) (1975) 51 CA3d 866, 124 CR 590. No statute 
mandates such a distinction. Despite noting that “the difference between prescriptive use and 
adverse possession is sometimes obscure” (51 CA3d at 876), the Raab court then made a hard 
and fast distinction between them and outlawed the protection of prescription for any heavy uses, 
such as encroachments, which came close to amounting to possessory interests.  
Thus, encroachments lose either way: They fail as prescriptive easements because their 
exclusivity makes them possessory, and they fail as possessory interests because they are not 
separately assessed by the taxing authorities. Owners of these interests are in trouble, and time is 
not on their side. 
Agreed Boundaries 
In Tremper v Quinones (2004) 115 CA4th 944, 9 CR3d 672, reported at p Error! Bookmark 
not defined., the owner of a 180-acre parcel encroached 660 feet, planting cacti and making 
other improvements on the unimproved 170-acre parcel of his neighbor. One of his defenses 
appeared to be that there was an agreed boundary between the parcels; given the courts’ hostile 
treatment of encroachments under the prescriptive easement doctrine, it is not surprising that the 
trial court rejected the agreed boundary contention here. There originally was an unqualified rule 
that agreements regarding boundaries can be inferred “from the long-standing acceptance of a 
fence as a boundary” (Ernie v Trinity Lutheran Church (1959) 51 C2d 702, 708, 336 P2d 525); 
that rule, however, has become confined to cases in which the true boundary cannot be 
ascertained from the records (Bryant v Blevins (1994) 9 C4th 47, 55, 36 CR2d 86). Modern 
surveying technology makes that a most unlikely situation. See Bernhardt, Deeds on the Ground 
or Words in the Deed: Bryant v Blevins, 18 CEB RPLR 141 (Apr. 1995). 
It may be that the agreed boundary doctrine will be applied only when there is proof of an 
actual agreement; and producing that evidence will become even more difficult as the years go 
by and the original neighbors move away or die off, since such agreements are usually oral. (One 
can hardly expect lay people to have put their boundary line agreements in writing when the 
reason for resorting to an oral agreement in the first place was their inability to understand the 
written boundary descriptions in their deeds. Just what were they supposed to say in this new 
writing?) That means that the older the encroachment, the less likely it is to gain protection under 
agreed-boundary law.  
Good Faith Improvements  
Finally, if all the above claims to defend the encroachment fail, can your client gain some 
relief as a good faith improver? In Tremper v Quinones, supra, the offending cactus farmer was 
allowed to remove his improvements, as CC §1013.5 provides. (In some cases, however, it may 
be impractical to remove the improvements; CCP §741 provides for leaving the improvement in 
place and giving the good faith improver an offset for the enhanced value of the land improved. 
But there is often no enhancement for an encroaching woodshed, and the offset applies only 
when the neighbor seeks damages rather than removal—which is the neighbor’s call, not the 
encroacher’s.) 
Thus, an encroacher not only lacks the option of paying for the removal of the encroachment, 
she also may be unable to even retrieve it. As fixtures, improvements to a neighbor’s property 
belong to the neighbor. See CC §1013. (For example, in Harrison v Welch, supra, the trial court 
properly held that Harrison now owned the trees that Welch had planted on his land.) You can’t 
remove what now belongs to your neighbor just because you originally put it there (unless you 
are a tenant and it constitutes a trade fixture).  
Civil Code of Procedure §871.5 permits a trial court to effect an “adjustment of the rights, 
equities, and interests of the good faith improver [and] the owner of the land . . . as is consistent 
with substantial justice. . . .” I take this to include the possibility of forcing the neighbor to sell 
the disputed land to the encroacher. But the right to such relief is discretionary and therefore 
quite uncertain. (And, as Tremper shows, the encroacher, even when she wins, has to pay 
attorney fees, as well all removal damages if she is allowed to take the improvement back). At 
best, an innocent improver confronts a large expenditure to correct her mistake.  
None of the Above  
None of the encroachers in the cases discussed above were intentional land thieves. Indeed, 
they almost never are. They are usually owners who made improvements that they wrongly 
believed were within their own property lines, or are purchasers who assumed that what they saw 
was what they were buying until a neighbor’s survey proved them wrong. With effective adverse 
possession and prescription laws, people can generally purchase property according to what they 
see, and assume that the long-standing walls and fences represent legal boundaries. However, as 
the doctrines that protect such expectations are increasingly weakened by hostile court decisions, 
the need for surveys increases correspondingly.  
Clients have always been well advised by their attorneys to pay for a survey before making 
improvements close to the lot lines. And now, perhaps, they should also be advised to pay for a 
survey even when purchasing the property in the first place, unless they are really sure that the 
fences, walls, improvements, and even landscaping, are nowhere near the boundary lines that 
those incomprehensible words in their deeds describe. 
 
